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1. Introduction  
The onset of the global financial crisis raises heightened concerns that economic 
protectionism will undermine the achievements of the single market, threatening to derail 
competitiveness and productivity in crisis-hit economies in Europe. With the sovereign debt crisis 
assuming center stage in political and academic debates (see Howarth et al., 2012), recent efforts 
to bolster the single market have elicited few commentaries despite being the cornerstone of EU 
economic integration (Pelkmans 2010; Egan, 2012; Heremans, 2011). Although often viewed with 
'suspicion and fear', the drive to complete the single market has once again moved to the top of the 
political agenda, after a series of concrete proposals aimed at its strengthening in response to the 
changing economic and political environment (Pelkmans, 2010; Egan 2012; Howarth and Sadeh, 
2010a).  Seizing the opportunity of the twentieth anniversary of the “1992” program, European 
policy makers have placed renewed focus on the untapped growth potential of the single market. 
Despite the erosion of political and social support for market integration, due to internal market 
fatigue, the 2010 Monti Report and subsequent Single Market Acts in 2011 and 2012 have sought 
to promote innovation and growth and reconcile market integration with social concerns and 
commitments through a series of proposals to deepen the single market (Monti, 2010, European 
Parliament, 2010, 2014).1 
However, the global context in which the single market now operates has fundamentally 
changed, as economies of scale and mass production have been replaced by a knowledge and 
service economy based on product differentiation. Though the new proposals focus heavily on 
opening up the single market in energy, digital, consumer and transport sectors, greater attention 
                                                             
1 The Commission’s Communication “Towards a Single Market Act”, which resulted in extensive public consultation 
and legislative revision, formed the basis of the Single Market Act agreed upon in April 2011 (European Commission, 
2010).  
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is clearly being given to remaining distortions to trade and innovation that affect business 
operations (BIS, 2011). European heads of state acknowledge "restrictive practices are rife" and 
that "implementation overall falls short of what is needed to open up markets fairly to competition" 
(House of Lords, March 18, 2011). The functioning of the single market is especially important 
for business exposed to international trade, as market openness impacts investment and trade 
patterns.  Variation in rules brings additional export costs that only some firms are able to 
overcome (Mayer and Ottoviano, 2007). For other companies, the heterogeneity in rules protects 
their market share and shields them from foreign competition (Mansfield and Busch, 1995; Lejour, 
2010). However, addressing regulatory barriers to trade is difficult as it is often hard to separate 
the protectionist intent of regulations from their purely domestic social welfare objectives (Smith, 
2010). If firms face a plethora of domestic rules and regulations that create market entry barriers 
and restrict trade flows, despite the adoption of European-wide rules, then the single market 
instruments are not fully effective as various barriers continue to impede market integration. At 
face value, the national scorecards and transposition records suggest high rates of compliance with 
European laws. Generally, it is assumed that the expansion and integration of national markets has 
been widespread as states have coordinated their efforts to align economic and legal boundaries to 
allow for the free movement of goods (Siegel, 2011; House of Lords, 2011; Egan and Guimarães, 
2012).  However, the reality for business may be very different as several studies have highlighted 
that de facto trade integration lags far behind de jure integration (BIS, 2011; Lejour, 2010; Kox 
and Lejour, 2005).   
This paper focuses on the challenges operating in the single market due to continued 
persistence of regulatory barriers to trade, despite being considered one of the most integrated and 
successful areas of market integration. We use a unique data set on infringements to the free 
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movement of goods to assess the types of barriers that firms encounter, their impact and variation 
across states and sectors, and their resolution method - through Court decisions or the pre-
litigation, administrative means available within the infringement proceedings mechanism to 
restore compliance. We also resort to the Solvit dataset provided to the authors by the Commission 
to analyse some features and the effectiveness of this informal mechanism in dealing with 
discriminatory domestic trade and regulatory practices.  
We examine four key questions: What are the most problematic policy areas in terms of 
barriers to trade that undermine the single market? What different dispute resolution mechanisms 
are utilized to address trade barriers and thus improve the functioning of the single market? Under 
what conditions are different enforcement mechanisms and strategies more likely to be used to 
resolve barriers for businesses operating in the single market? How important and effective are the 
more informal strategies in improving market access? In doing so, our goal is to link the research 
on trade barriers to that of implementation and compliance to assess the diverse strategies 
undertaken to reduce regulatory barriers to trade. 
This is important in the context of other regional trade efforts as the emergence of mega-
regional trade agreements has focused on a deep integration agenda that includes liberalization of 
specific goods and services, as well as addressing divergent regulations and standards. The 
complexity of regulatory barriers and their entrenched nature makes overcoming differences 
difficult. Despite the existence of a highly legalized framework, the European Union, like other 
international organizations, finds that it continually needs to address lack of compliance with the 
goals and objectives of its institutional commitments through a variety of internal trade remedies 
that serve to address cross-border restrictions. The European experience has often been touted as 
a model to emulate without focusing on the different approaches to regulatory convergence, as 
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well as the legal frameworks, enforcement and compliance mechanisms that underpin the 
continued European efforts to address barriers to cross-border trade.  In practice, Europe seeks to 
facilitate cross-border trade using a mixture of formal measures such as directives and regulations, 
treaties and bilateral measures, as well as soft law, principles, guidelines and codes of conduct, 
dialogue and exchange of information, recognition and incorporation of international standards. 
Regional integration efforts that cover an increasing range of goods and services provide 
governments with a chance to experiment with various ruling making and market opening 
initiatives that allow us to learn from different comparative lessons and rule-making dynamics 
(Sauvé and Mattoo, 2004, p. 4). 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is a brief overview of efforts at improving the 
governance of the single market over the past two decades. Section 3 documents the extent to 
which barriers to trade exist in the single market. Section 4 outlines and discusses the different 
strategies and instruments to address the persistence of barriers to trade and to facilitate market 
access. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Single Market Governance  
Although common rules can reduce business uncertainty and foster reciprocal market access, 
the literature has predominantly focused on explaining either variations in compliance and 
implementation across member states (Falkner et al, 2005; Börzel et al, 2010) or the increasing 
differentiation of rules and policies that reflect a more variable mode of integration, undermining 
the uniformity of the single market (Hanf, 2008; Howarth and Sadeh, 2010(a) (b); Dyson and 
Sepos, 2010). Studies that focus on compliance problems have offered explanations about the 
continued problems facing business and consumers by differentiating between voluntary versus 
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non voluntary violations of European legislation. These explanations have highlighted problems 
stemming from a lack of government capacity that results in the incorrect transposition of 
European laws into the domestic arena, the slow pace of legislative amendment to existing national 
rules, the raising of domestic standards or laws through ‘gold plating’ that causes the rules to be 
more onerous for business than justified by European law, or domestic opposition contesting the 
implementation and compliance of specific European laws (Börzel et al., 2010) For many scholars 
this issue represents a management deficit (Metcalfe, 1996) where administrative capacity and 
coordinating mechanisms cause implementation and enforcement problems in the single market 
(Sutherland, 1992). For others, the problems reflect the increasing complexity of policy-making 
due to “differentiated integration” in applying the acquis (Dyson and Sepos, 2010, p.5), as the 
differential application of EU law in some policy domains (Hanf, 2008) creates additional costs 
for business in meeting multiple rules and market entry conditions. Few if any, have linked these 
findings to the varying efforts that the EU has pursued to promote single market governance 
through administrative and regulatory reform.  
While discriminatory regulations create some rents for domestic incumbents, the EU has in 
fact pursued a range of options to address market distortions, focusing heavily on improving 
regulatory quality and governance to enhance the functioning of the single market (Radaelli, 1998). 
Successive Commission Presidents have pushed for regulatory reform, with Santer launching a 
regulatory simplification initiative (1996), Prodi promoting an action plan on better regulation 
(2002), and Barroso seeking to simplify regulatory initiatives and provide for regulatory impact 
assessment in monitoring and evaluating new legislative initiatives (Barroso, 2009).These 
proposals amount to a general effort to improve enforcement of Single Market laws, simplify rules, 
and deal more successfully with infringements by member states. The creation of a scoreboard to 
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pressure member states to be more responsive to their legal obligations within the internal market 
does highlight the growing emphasis on monitoring single market compliance (Radaelli, 1998; 
Pelkmans and Brito, 2012). Other evidence based tools such as the Single Market Review and 
Market Monitoring Tool were applied to specific sectors to assess the performance of different 
markets. Yet often such monitoring tools focus on how well the EU and EFTA states comply with 
their obligations in terms of implementation of EU legislation in a timely manner, so that the 
transposition of European legislation into domestic laws does not give us a sense of the actual 
working of single market in practice.    
Renewed political momentum followed the 2010 Monti Report, which proposed an 
ambitious "new strategy to safeguard the single market from the risk of economic nationalism" 
and offered a genuine strategy to revive the single market (Heremans, 2011; Pelkmans, 2010). 
Warning that "across industry lines, business is unhappy with the many remaining obstacles in 
terms of fragmentation and bottlenecks", Monti concluded that in the long term there is a need for 
a "more coherent enforcement system in which infringement procedures, informal problem solving 
mechanisms and private enforcement through national courts form a seamless web of remedies 
against breaches of EU law" (Monti, 2010, p.9). However, in the short term, the report calls on the 
Commission to use its existing infringement powers with increased determination and align it with 
those it currently has under competition policy (Monti, 2010, p. 98). Not only does Monti conclude 
that the EU need to address the remaining gaps in the single market,  equally important is delivering 
a functioning single market through assessment of the state of implementation of market rules 
(Monti, 2010, p. 94). The European Commission has built on this through its Annual growth 
surveys in which it stresses the importance of the regulatory performance of the single market, 
while the European Council proposed to strengthen the governance of the single market so that it 
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can effectively deliver growth. The Bureau of Policy Advisors also commissioned a report on the 
costs of non-Europe. This focused on the untapped potential of the single market, focusing on the 
business environment in terms of regulations, productivity and industry dynamics, to demonstrate 
continued market fragmentation across specific sectors and industries (BEPA, 2013). Europe 
Economics performed a similar assessment for the British government about the performance of 
the single market in light of the discussions about competence review, although the report did not 
focus on what were the most effective tools for monitoring and evaluation of the functioning of 
the single market (European Economics, 2014).  More recently, the European Parliament adopted 
a single market governance procedure in order to promote economic convergence between 
member states within and outside the euro area, while also focusing on the quality of 
implementation of single market laws within member states (European Parliament, 2014a). 
Systematic sector and industry monitoring which would help identify and address specific 
obstacles that firms face in the single market is scarce, according to Holmes and Rollo (2010). 
This may be due either underreporting of trade barriers or simply foregoing access to specific 
markets due to continued trade impediments.  
Complaints from business indicate that barriers continue to impede their operations, 
suggesting that the law on the ground is very different from the legal framework of the treaties 
(Egan and Guimarães, 2012). Oscillating perceptions from European business provide some 
important insights about how market fragmentation impacts their business strategies. While a large 
business survey conducted by the European Commission in 1998 indicated more than 82% 
participate in the single market, this positive picture has changed over time, as the anticipated 
benefits of market consolidation have given way to increased concern over the cost of compliance 
with European regulations. Among the largest resource is the European Business Test Panel where 
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the most recent survey indicates that diversity of national rules is the main obstacle to cross-border 
trade in the single market (EBTP, 2011). Of those firms surveyed that conduct cross-border trade 
56% encounter high levels of administrative barriers in another member state, 40% believe that 
public authorities discriminate between national and foreign businesses, and 17% do not engage 
in cross border trade due to the legal and tax requirements that constitute barriers to market entry. 
European businesses remain concerned about the enforcement of European rules regarding four 
freedoms and rights of establishment, with one out of five French and German businesses 
indicating that their export potential is hampered by prospective or perceived regulatory barriers 
(Eurobarometer, 2010; Egan and Guimarães, 2012). British firms have also noted that their 
participation in the Single Market is marred by regulations and red tape, although there remains strong 
support for the single market across different sectors (IOD, 2014). 
To improve the credibility and effectiveness of the single market, Monti stressed the need 
for soft law mechanisms to deal with market access problems, and improvements in the operation 
of hard law mechanisms such as the infringement process to deal with non-compliance with single 
market directives (see House of Lords, 2011; Heremans, 2011; Pelkmans, 2010; Egan and 
Guimarães, 2012). This is not a new issue for the single market, but it raises important concerns 
about the effectiveness of remedies against breaches of EU law and what dispute mechanisms 
work best to address persistent trade barriers (Monti, 2010, p. 97).  
Scholars assume that compliance with judicial decisions consistently occurs – but do not 
unpack the different types of legal remedies available to address barriers to trade.2 The burgeoning 
literature on compliance has begun to assess the impact of litigation on different policy areas within 
the European Union, but only a small subset of this work examines the range of options available 
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to address non-tariff barriers, and their effectiveness in tackling barriers to trade. Compliance is 
however, a relational concept in which there is an interaction between courts and states and firms 
that are impacted by the decisions, given that their reactions are a key component in measuring the 
effectiveness of legal remedies (Kapiszewski and Taylor, 2013). The main theories tend to focus 
on either management or enforcement approaches to highlight the policy tools available to handle 
implementation problems, which involves either a problem-solving approach based on improving 
administrative capacity or a more coercive approach based on monitoring and sanctions (Tallberg, 
2002). With this in mind, our goal is to outline the extent to which barriers to trade hinder the 
functioning of the single market, and then map out the strategies utilized to tackle barriers to trade 
before providing some statistical data on their effectiveness. Our goal is to first highlight the 
barriers to trade within single market, then the trade remedies available to address them, and 
conclude with some analysis and observations of how these trade remedies actually work in 
practice.  
 
3. Trade barriers hindering the single market 
International trade is hampered by a variety of non-tariff barriers emerging out of national 
regulations. The fact that these regulations often differ by market, means that the fixed costs of 
complying with regulations are sunk costs and impact the choice about whether to produce 
different products and services due to regulatory heterogeneity. There are several different 
categories of barriers that impede market access. These may include quantitative-restrictive 
barriers such as restrictions on foreign ownership, discriminatory or preferential access to specific 
services or activities, or specific local content restrictions. Other barriers may also be price related 
such as specific price controls or charges for services, and fees that apply to foreign operators such 
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as transfer pricing, double taxation and user fees.  A common form of market distortion can occur 
through domestic regulations derived from technical regulations and standards, licensing and 
qualification requirements. Countries can and do impose qualification and licensing requirements 
on foreign providers that may be more burdensome than necessary to satisfy otherwise legitimate 
public policy objectives. These licenses, qualification and certification requirements may also have 
operational or regulatory restrictions for foreign providers of goods or services. If the regulation 
is applied to domestic and foreign producers equally, then it may not in itself, be a regulatory 
barrier as it does not violate the principle of non-discrimination. However, the trade hampering 
effects can occur if there are additional compliance costs to enter the market or if the principle of 
mutual equivalence of regulatory norms and standards is not effectively implemented on the 
ground by administrative authorities or customs officials.  
To further assess the pervasiveness of cross-border trade impediments in the single market 
and the pattern of compliance with the free movement of goods, we draw on a large original dataset 
provided by the European Commission containing information on business complaints on 
violations of articles 28 and 30 of the EU Treaty, presently article 34 and 36 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU), as well as on the subsequent efforts to address them.  The data set 
contains 2319 infringement cases and covers the period from 1961 to 2002.3 It provides 
information on the EU15 member states but not on the post 2004 enlargement member states. 
Aggregation of the data was required to allow for statistical analysis. The data was categorized 
and coded along several dimensions, including a) member state; b) type of industry; c) category of 
barrier; d) national policy instrument that implements the barrier; and e) enforcement mechanism 
used to address the violations.  
                                                             
3 Since then, the data set has not been updated; this may be due to the adoption of alternative conflict resolution 
mechanisms.  
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We conducted bivariate analysis of the relationship between member states and types of 
barriers, and types of barriers and industries, and the results show that there are significant 
relationships between them.4 The data indicate that firms encounter more obstacles to cross border 
trade in France, Germany and Italy, which account for over 50% of the notified restrictions in the 
single market in goods. The food sector is the most problematic in terms of overall notified trade 
barriers (31%) followed by the automotive sector, (18%), equipment (13%), health (11%) and 
chemicals (8%). Companies have complained about restrictions in exporting foodstuffs in thirteen 
of the EU 15 states, targeting Greece as the most restrictive state (46%) with Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands all registering more than 30% of overall reported barriers 
in this sector, making it the most problematic in terms of obstacles to cross border trade (c.f. 
Jervelund et al., 2012).The food sector is the most affected by barriers in France and Italy (18% 
each), followed by Germany (16%) and Greece (12%). Health industries face more barriers in 
Germany (28%), followed by France (12%). The automotive industry experiences significant 
barriers  in France (30%), while in the chemical industry  there are more barriers to entry in 
Germany and France (19% each) and the equipment sector is mainly affected by barriers in France 
(21%). 
In terms of the relationship between types of barriers and industries, the results show that 
technical and administrative barriers (comprising product requirements, labeling and packaging) 
are the most frequent barriers in the single market (56%) and are mainly used in the food (35%) 
and automotive (26%) industries. Government restrictive practices and policies relating to 
intellectual property rights, monopolies and subsidies account for 16% of all barriers and mainly 
used in the health industry. Barriers related to mutual recognition represent 18% of all barriers, 
                                                             
4 The chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.000 level for member states and types of barriers (2197 observations); 
and significant at 0.000 level for types of barriers and industrial sectors (1680 observations).  
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affecting primarily the equipment industry. Technical and administrative barriers are the primary 
type of obstacle in all sectors (except equipment) reaching 72% in the food sector. The 
pervasiveness of barriers in some sectors seems to be associated with rent seeking behavior which 
keeps the EU single market fragmented and limits the capacity of member states economies to 
fully reap the benefits of the single market. Non-tariff or institutional barriers are thus a crucial 
impediment for firms cross-border trade "as they may function as a fixed export cost that firms 
have to overcome" before they are able to successfully operate in multiple markets (Smeets, 2010). 
 
4. Remedies to address barriers to trade: evaluating hard and soft law mechanisms  
While the EU adopts detailed harmonized regulations as well as more flexible alternatives 
such as mutual recognition, while also promoting self-regulation, co-regulation, delegation to 
private bodies, and reliance on member states to ensure compliance, it has shifted the transaction 
costs from market integration to the implementation stage (Schmidt, 2009, p.8). The major issue 
is whether the regulatory regime works in practice and if there are mechanisms in place to address 
the conflicts that emerge from non-compliance (see Smith, 2010; Pelkmans et al., 2008; Schmidt, 
2009).   
Compliance with international commitments becomes increasingly important to ensure that 
violations of treaty obligations are costly so that governments follow through on their trade 
commitments. How credible are different strategies that the EU uses to 'tie the hands' of member 
states and ensure that protectionist pressures do not undermine cross border trade by retaining 
restrictive rules and administrative barriers? Börzel et al. (2010) explain that the European Union 
must carefully balance the trade-offs between a judicial enforcement approach and a more flexible 
approach which relies on persuasion, learning and socialization as a means of altering member 
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states behavior and strategic calculations, so that they comply with European rules and norms. 
Empirical studies of compliance provide evidence that enforcement, management and socialization 
approaches are each supported and relevant in improving European regulatory governance 
(Mbaye, 2001; Tallberg, 2002; Börzel et al., 2010).  More recent studies also highlight variation 
across policy areas and legislative tools, due in part to differences in monitoring capacity at the 
national level, growing complexity of legislative acts, and the salience of administrative discretion 
that has fostered more non-judicial and informal efforts at negotiated solutions to compliance 
problems (Börzel et al., 2010; Mastenbroek, 2005).  
Keleman (2006) in his work on adversarial legalism contests this view, arguing that the 
systemic judicialization of the single market is high, as the European Union has created new 
mechanisms for rule-making and monitoring compliance. By contrast, new modes of governance 
have attracted significant attention as soft law, voluntary agreements and self-regulation are seen 
as offering more flexible means of compliance, and an alternative to the judicialization of 
policymaking (Trubek and Mosher, 2003; Radaelli, 1998). 
  
4.1 Infringement proceedings 
Although enforcement of European law is the responsibility of the European Commission 
and the member states, the Commission has the right to bring legal action against member states 
that it believes have not met their legal obligations. Opening infringement proceedings was the 
key governance mechanism to tackle barriers to trade, until the Commission chose to settle single 
market disputes through more informal mechanisms in the early 2000s.  These infringement 
proceedings begin with administrative notification by the Commission and the possibility of 
voluntary member state compliance, followed by a formal Commission opinion requiring member 
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state reply, and ultimately referral of the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). If the member 
state does not follow the ruling of the ECJ (article 258 TFEU), a second infringement procedure 
can be initiated and financial sanctions can be imposed (article 260 TFEU).  
Börzel finds that the application of compliance instruments, and especially judicial 
proceedings and sanctions, can alter the cost benefit calculations of states as they face legal costs 
and reputational losses for non-compliance (Panke, 2012; Börzel et al., 2010). The jurisdictional 
control by the Court also lengthens the dispute resolution process, as infringement proceedings 
may have been the result of highly politicized opposition domestically.  This is particularly true if 
the costs are concentrated or if the perceived costs of compliance are high in terms of the rate of 
return, so that there is pressure to maintain the status quo (see also Siegel, 2011). Also, member 
states with good transposition, implementation, and compliance rates may have the lowest rates of 
litigation and judicial sanctions. The likelihood of choosing to settle through formal judicial 
litigation or pre litigation administrative to address trade barriers remains understudied. In what 
conditions are trade barriers solved in Court or in the pre-litigation phase of the infringement 
proceeding?  
Based on the infringement proceedings dataset and using probit analysis, we are able to 
assess whether strategies of compliance vary by country, whether barriers in specific sectors are 
more likely to be resolved in Court, or whether specific trade barriers are more likely to be subject 
to judicial proceedings. Recognizing that litigating incurs costs and potential sanctions, we 
measure the determinants of having a case solved in the EU Court by conducting multiple probit 
estimates. For each of the EU 15 member states, we include several explanatory variables: (1) the 
industrial sectors aggregated into the following categories – automotive, food, equipment, 
chemical, and other industries; (2) the types of barriers, classified as technical and administrative 
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barriers, government restrictive practices (public procurement, intellectual property protection), 
mutual recognition, and other barriers5; (3) implementation instruments (policy tools used to apply 
the barriers), namely legislative acts, administrative practices, and other less conventional 
instruments.  
Though the vast majority of cases are settled in the early stages of infringement 
proceedings (see Menindrou, 1996), we assume that member states have different preferences on 
whether or not to refer an infringement to the EU Court. Recognizing that using the EU Court 
involves costs we expect that small states with fewer resources to be more likely to use the pre-
litigation mechanisms as they are less able to bear the cost of judicial actions and potential 
sanctions. We also expect that small states may prefer these mechanisms to settle disputed barriers 
due to fear of retaliation or for reputational reasons associated with the publicity that a EU Court 
decision on a violation of EU internal market law may entail (see also Panke, 2012). The cost of 
such negative publicity is higher for smaller than for larger countries, and as a result, these 
countries are less likely to go to court and more likely to resolve problems quickly to maintain 
their reputation and credibility.  
As for differences between industries, we expect the use of the EU Court to be less likely 
in industries such as chemicals and automotive where the market is characterized by the existence 
of large companies that want to avoid the reputational costs of having their business practices 
condemn by the EU Court. We expect the food and health industries, which can use specific 
exemptions as a means to retain domestic health and safety regulations, to be most likely to resist 
domestic changes in laws and continue to restrict foreign products on their markets through various 
administrative and regulatory barriers. 
                                                             
5 The taxonomy was based and adapted from UNCTAD (Bora et al., 2000). 
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We also expect the coefficients for the types of barriers to be different. Barriers resulting 
from non-implementation of mutual recognition may be more likely to be solved outside the EU 
Court as a result of strong business criticism in the 1990s of the legal tradition of “basing 
everything on case law” (Pelkmans, 2010a)  which was directly impacting on cross-border market 
access. In the case of technical barriers and administrative practices and  of government restrictive 
practices for example, on the contrary it is harder to separate potential protectionist intents from 
legitimate public interest goals, such as protection of health and life of humans or protection of  
industrial and commercial property and to prove that restrictive practices and policies are not used 
as means of arbitrary discrimination and as disguised barriers to trade among member states; hence 
these types of barriers tend to be resolved in Court.  
Regarding the policy instruments that implement the barriers, we expect that the case is 
more likely to go to the EU Court if the barrier is applied through an administrative practice, as 
this may be subject to different interpretations and the member state may try to get favorable 
decision in the Court; as Versluis (2007) argues ‘practical’ or ‘administrative’ implementation 
relates to socio-political interpretation. Legislative acts are assessed against the “law on the 
books”, and may more bluntly be violating the free movement of goods, thus the chances of 
winning a case in the Court are smaller and informal modes of enforcement are preferred over 
adversarial strategies. 
Our dependent variable is the solution of the case where Y = 1 if the case is solved in Court 
and Y = 0 if the case has an out of Court solution. We controlled for country of origin of the 
infringement, for the industrial sector where the infringement occurred, for the type of barrier and 
for the instrument used to implement the barrier. The reference group includes the cases with the 
following characteristics, France, food industry, technical barriers and administrative practices and 
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legislative acts, which all had the highest frequencies. The expected rate of a case going to court 
for the reference group is 18.27%.  The results of the probit estimation are shown in Table 1. 
If we control for country of origin, the coefficients for Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Austria are not significant, 
therefore the probability of their infringements going to court is not different from France. The 
results for three countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) are statistically significant and have 
negative signs, showing that these countries are more likely to solve infringements in the informal 
pre-Court phases. Spain and Portugal have the highest likelihood of solving the cases outside of 
court (17.5% and 17% smaller probability respectively, relative to France), followed by Greece 
(7%). The results for The Netherlands, on the contrary, have a positive sign and are statistically 
significant; the Netherlands is in fact 16% more likely to solve its cases in court than France. These 
results suggest that the hypothesis put forward in the compliance literature that small states are 
more likely to use more informal mechanisms of compliance is not confirmed, as size seems not 
to explain the use of informal methods. Instead the use of these methods seems to be associated 
with the southern Europe enlargement countries, in line with Börzel’s (2000) conclusion that 
Greece, Spain and Portugal have a lower number of infringement cases referred to the EU Court 
of Justice, whereas Italy, on the contrary, is on top of the list of countries with referrals to the 
Court.  
When we control for the industrial sectors, the automotive, chemical, equipment and health 
industries, all are more likely to have cases solved outside the EU Court than the Food industry, in 
particular the infringements on the Chemical sector, which are 14% less likely to go to Court. The 
prevalence of infringements referred to the ECJ related to food industry may be associated with 
the fact that often national industries operate under different strong regulatory barriers and 
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domestic standards, and in some EU countries in the absence of relevant legislation in some EU 
countries, which associated with costly conformity requirements, may explain why infringement 
cases are less likely to be settled in the initial, non-judicial stages of the proceedings. 
Controlling for the types of barriers, two are less likely to go to Court as both display 
negative signs and are significant -  mutual recognition obstacles (less 22%) and Other barriers 
(less 19%).6 Finally, the estimates of the implementation instruments control variables are 
statistically significant, though administrative practices have a positive sign and other less 
conventional instruments a negative sign. This indicates that barriers resulting from administrative 
instruments are 27% more likely to go to Court than barriers contained in specific national 
legislative acts, which confirms our initial hypothesis. Violations of the free movement of goods 
resulting from administrative practices related to paper work requirements and red tape for 
example, are thus more likely to be sent to Court than barriers contained in legislative acts that 
were not amended by timely transposition, for example; the former allow for more discretion and 
may easily be used as disguised protectionist measures calling for litigation in the court rather than 
mutual trust and informal mechanisms. 
Table 1. Elimination of trade barriers in EU Court 
 
 
Variables dy/dx P>z 
 
Countries 
Germany -0.0415842 0.133  
Italy 0.0109542 0.725  
Luxembourg 0.0647446 0.458  
Portugal -0.1707338 0.000 *** 
United Kingdom -0.0080468 0.838  
Spain -0.1750898 0.000 *** 
Ireland 0.1110551 0.153  
Belgium 0.0840578 0.058  
                                                             
6 Due to collinearity the variable “government restrictive practices” was dropped out. 
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Greece -0.0779679 0.006 ** 
Netherlands 0.1661687 0.002 ** 
Denmark -0.0100438 0.869  
Finland -0.0722197 0.380  
Sweden -0.0616594 0.380  
Austria -0.073695 0.129  
Industries 
Automotive -0.1253801 0.000 *** 
Chemical -0.1482136 0.000 *** 
Equipment -0.0739023 0.003 ** 
Health -0.0813493 0.000 *** 
Other Industries 0.0056766 0.820  
Types of Barriers 
Mutual Recognition -0.2182201 0.000 *** 
Other Barriers -0.1929913 0.000 *** 
Implementation 
Instruments 
Administ. Practices 0.2742367 0.000 *** 
Other Instruments -0.2046603 0.000 *** 
                 *** p>0.001, ** p>0.01, * p>0.05 
4.2 The post 2002 strategy: soft modes of compliance 
In line with the member states’ preference for solving infringement cases out of Court, the 
European Commission has been promoting more informal problem solving capacities instead of 
opting for formal infringement mechanisms to solve perceived violations of EU law. This is 
particularly true since 2002, when the Commission established the Solvit network designed to 
address barriers created by the misapplication of single market rules through informal coordination 
among member states, to avoid legal proceedings. Companies can seek pragmatic and rapid 
solutions to barriers to trade, and the Commission may also refer complaints to Solvit if there is a 
good chance that the barriers can be removed without legal action.7  
Increased reliance on informal mechanisms has translated into two additional initiatives - 
the EU Pilot and Enterprise European Network schemes - both created in 2008 to address 
                                                             
7 However, sometimes overcoming the barriers requires a change in national legislation, in administrative practices, 
guidelines and other formal implementation provisions that Solvit cannot resolve.  
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impediments to cross border trade through negotiation, learning and deliberation. These are part 
of a larger set of instruments and mechanisms that the Commission has put in place to reinforce 
informal governance methods of the single market. Table 2 shows the diversity of presently 
existing informal mechanisms to improve compliance and a better functioning of the single market.    
  Table 2. Informal mechanisms to address single market non-compliance issues 
  
Preventive 
iniciative 
Channel for 
request of 
information 
and advice 
Channel to 
report 
barriers 
Soft dispute 
resolution 
scheme 
Pre 
litigation 
administrati
ve initiative 
TRIS - Technical 
Regulations Information 
System 
X     
IMI - Internal Market 
Information System 
X     
RIA - Regulatory Impact 
Assessmemt 
X     
RAPEX - Rapid Alert 
System for Non-Food 
Consumer Products 
X     
RASFF -  Rapid Alert 
System for Food and Feed 
X     
Internal Market Scoreboards X     
Your Europe  X    
Europe Direct  X    
ECC-NET - European 
Consumer Centers Network 
 X    
EEN - Enterprise Europe 
Network 
 X    
EU Pilot  X X X  
Solvit    X  
Ad hoc contacts    X  
Package  Meetings    X  
Networks of civil servants    X  
FIN-Net    X  
European Small Claims 
Procedure 
   X  
Letter of formal notice     X 
Reasoned Opinion     X 
These include preventive initiatives of market surveillance and channels to address requests of 
information and advice, and channels to actually report barriers; a set of different soft dispute 
resolution schemes to solve complaints were created, and in case an actual proceeding is opened 
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by the Commission, it still tries to use up its pre-litigation administrative initiatives before referring 
the case to the Court. 
Surprisingly, existing approaches to noncompliance with European laws do not emphasize 
the efficacy of compliance solutions (Eberlein and Radaelli, 2010). However, these informal 
methods and preventive initiatives provide opportunities to improve market access and enhance 
competition in the Single Market and indeed, they can contribute to “EU growth through 
enforcement” (Jervelund et al., 2012, p.58).  Interactivity, information sharing, voluntary 
cooperation and negotiated resolution of non-compliance (Woll et al., 2007) legitimize informal 
governance and may promote “internalization” of European rules, dissuade non-compliance and 
persuade more adherence to single market rules. This "facilitated coordination" differs from the 
more formal implementation process in focusing on deliberation between public and private actors, 
and at different levels of government. 
 
4.3. Solvit in practice: features and effectiveness 
Using a data set made available to the authors by the European Commission with the cases 
handled by Solvit services since its inception in 2002 until mid-2013, we analyze how this network 
has been allowing for the identification and removal of barriers in EU cross-border trade, 
improving market access and competition in the Single Market. Between 2002 and mid-2013, 
Solvit services alone registered 407 complaints of breaches of law the free movement of goods in 
the Single Market, representing 29% of all business complaints. The evolution in the number of 
cases handled by Solvit services since 2002 (Figure 1) contrasts with the decrease in the number 
of formal infringement proceedings handled by the Commission (about 80 in 2004 to 15 in 2010) 
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and in the number of new cases opened after this informal mechanism was introduced (from 30 to 
5), as shown in Figure 2. 
      Figure 1. Number of cases handled by Solvit services (2002-2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Decrease in the number of formal infringement proceedings 
 
 
Source: Data compiled from the Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of 
 EU Law. European Commission (2005-2011). 
 
The countries that place more cases in the Solvit network are mostly Sweden, Czech 
Republic, The Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, mostly northern and 
central Europe member states, which are the leading countries in trying to open EU markets to 
cross border trade using these soft methods. The main defendant member states in the Solvit 
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network are France, Germany, Spain and Italy, large EU countries, which were also countries with 
more formal infringement proceedings opened by the Commission. Countries where more barriers 
are encountered (defendants) are not the same countries that make more complaints about barriers 
in other member states. This seems to suggest that there is not a bilateral retaliatory dynamics in 
making complaints about barriers to trade; indeed, the difference between the number of cases as 
complainant and as defendant is quite large for some member states, such as Austria, Czech 
Republic and UK (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Solvit cases by country (as complainant and as defendant) 
 
 
Solvit average resolution rate is 84%, though in cases involving the free movement of 
goods it is 74%. An analysis of resolution rates by member state shows that Solvit resolution rate, 
i.e. its effectiveness in opening markets, varies from country to country; with few exceptions, if its 
resolution rate is above (below) the average, it will be above (below) the average despite the 
country acts as complainant or as defendant. The exceptions are Germany, France, Latvia, and 
Slovakia, in which Solvit resolution rate is below average when these countries are complainants 
and above average when they act as defendants, suggesting they are less open to informal problem 
solving when they detect barriers abroad than when barriers are spotted in their own national 
markets by other EU countries. On the contrary, when Spain, Poland, Romania and Finland act as 
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complainants, Solvit resolution rate is above the average, but below average if they act as 
defendants, suggesting they may be resisting a negotiated solution when alleged problems are 
found in their own markets  
When trying to identify the main pairs of countries involved in Solvit negotiated solutions 
we find that large countries tend to target large countries, and neighbors also tend to target each 
other. The United Kingdom targets more often France (12 cases), The Netherlands target more 
frequently both Belgium and France (12 cases each), France makes more complaints regarding 
Italy (9), and the Czech Republic regarding Slovakia (9). Germany and Belgium both target more 
frequently France (8 cases).  
The geographical dispersion of the number of cases varies across member states: of the 30 
countries in the dataset that may resort to Solvit (27 EU member states plus Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein), Sweden used this dispute resolution mechanism to target 16 countries, Denmark 
regarding 15 countries, Austria claiming barriers in 13 countries, and The Netherlands, Germany 
and Czech Republic in 10. This elucidates which countries are making a geographically more 
diversified effort to open EU markets. While countries with more Solvit cases may target more 
countries, there are cases like Portugal with fewer Solvit cases (15) that target many countries (11); 
on the contrary, France has the largest number of cases (58) but concentrates its efforts for 
increased market openness in merely 9 trading partners. 
Time length is one of the main reasons why a judicial solution to Single Market disputes 
is often avoided (Siegel, 2011). One of the purposes of Solvit, as an informal alternative to other 
more formal problem-solving mechanisms, is to find solutions within 70 days since the case is 
taken by the Solvit center in the country where the problem occurred. While for all areas of EU 
Single Market law the average time elapsed is 81 days, cases in the free movement of goods take 
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an average 92 days, suggesting that even using voluntary negotiated solutions removing trade is 
more time consuming than eliminating frictions in other areas of the Single market. Our data also 
shows that there is variation across member states in Solvit resolution time, ranging from an 
average of 208 days for cases involving Italy and 46 days for Finland (both as defendant countries), 
suggesting different resistance postures to change behavior when barriers in their markets are 
reported to Solvit (Figure 4).  As could be expected, cases in which a solution is found tend to take 
less time than average to close, and also each member state takes less time to close cases for which 
a solution is found than for unresolved cases. These may be the instances in which member states 
may have to resort to formal complaints to the Commission or use other formal mechanisms such 
as national court procedures.  
Figure 4. Average days to close cases 
 
        Note: The figure only includes countries with at least 10 cases 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Twenty years of liberalization have produced a deeply integrated, but still incomplete 
single market. Building on the Monti Report in 2010, and legislative proposals subsequently 
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enshrined in two Single Market Acts in 2011 and 2012, the efforts to address the remaining cross-
border barriers in key areas highlight the need to focus on issues of enforcement and compliance 
with European rules especially in the wake of the financial crisis. The Single European Market 
suggests that substantive regulatory harmonization or coordination can be achieved among 
developed economies. Yet in many instances there are negative trade effects as business faces 
additional constraints in operating in a single market as member states fail to properly apply 
existing laws, mutual recognition is incorrectly applied or firms face continued barriers to trade 
due to the inability to achieve some degree of regulatory coordination. This takes sustained effort 
to ensure a regular and predictable business environment, so compliance with European law is a 
critical factor to ensure that trade and investment barriers are addressed. 
Understanding what strategies are used and how effectively they can address barriers to 
trade is a key component in understanding how to address the myriad of different national 
regulations that often create trade frictions. A more sustained focus on explaining the different 
variety and usage of ‘internal’ trade remedies within the EU can highlight a range of tools that 
other regions can employ to address regulatory divergences that can hinder trade and growth in a 
regional market and to foster regulatory cooperation. However, negotiating new rules on areas 
such as data privacy, rail transport liberalization, and liberal professions, has not been easy and 
substantial differences in the negotiating positions of member states suggests that market access 
commitments can be difficult to deliver. Europe is also confronted by a difficult issue of whether 
some minimal exclusion will be tolerated to give domestic governments the necessary flexibility 
to appease domestic pressures, and what impact such differential market integration plays in 
fostering regional cooperation.   
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Our empirical analysis shows that in the EU single market there is preference for informal 
mechanisms and negotiated solutions to foster market integration and to address reported barriers 
to trade, though there is variation depending on the country, type of barrier and industry; secondly, 
it shows that Solvit effectiveness to overcome barriers to trade by voluntary cooperation is high, 
although the resolution rate of trade issues is slightly smaller than in other Solvit legal areas, and 
it takes the network longer to close these cases; this seems to suggest that efforts to open goods 
markets by improving compliance through voluntary cooperation is, nonetheless a laborious task.  
In providing an assessment of the most effective regulatory measures to address barriers to trade, 
there are some concerns that soft law mechanisms are not valuable in addressing regulatory barriers 
to trade. The conclusion we draw from this paper is that soft measures can generate satisfactory 
results provided that states were faced with a credible threat of legal intervention. As suggested by 
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ thesis there needs to be options to litigate through infringement 
procedures if barriers are not resolved through informal soft law mechanisms. Although there is 
significant attention among scholars given to judicial recourse, such an approach neglects the other 
newer enforcement tools that can be used to reduce barriers to cross border mobility, market access 
and trade. We have shown that the pre-litigation measures are also important in promoting 
regulatory cooperation in the single market. At least as important for regulatory cooperation is the 
growth of informal cheaper strategies such as Solvit in the European context. These should be 
coupled with measures to prevent trade barriers from arising in the single market through the 
notification of pending national standards and regulations. We would argue that there is a tendency 
in the academic and policy literature to focus on ex post mechanisms, especially litigation efforts, 
rather than on measures to prevent new barriers to trade from emerging, which would suggest that 
more attention needs to be paid to issues of preemption, early warning mechanisms and notification 
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of pending legislation, especially as states are regulating new issues in both service and product 
markets.  
Other similar "internal" trade remedies are being introduced in other regional contexts. 
While these have generated some criticism as being simply ‘window dressing’ in addressing 
barriers to trade, the experience of the European single market suggests that it can give 
policymakers a better sense of the reality of market access barriers on the ground.  When firms are 
polled they often stress that a clear single set of rules provides legal certainty, enables them to 
invest in new products and technologies with more confidence and that such regulatory 
convergence attracts foreign direct investment. While non-EU trade is also increasing for some 
member states, particularly with emerging markets, this also suggests that being able to promote 
European rules in third country markets - the so-called 'market power' effect (Damro, 2011),  is 
also more salient if there are common European rules and norms. However, this phenomenon is 
often touted rather than empirically demonstrated. This suggests that more attention needs to be 
paid to the external dimension of single market governance, the perception of business outside of 
Europe in terms of market access, and the formal and informal mechanisms and tools used by 
foreign companies to address perceived market entry barriers in the European context that are not 
simply de facto a WTO trade complaint. These issues are of increasing importance given global 
supply chains and product market integration, as well as the expansion of cross-regional FTA. The 
push for regulatory coherence to foster a transatlantic market is drawing on some of the same 
modalities and approaches that have been used in the single market. Hence, the importance of 
focusing not just on the negotiations but on implementation and compliance with such agreements 
based on an understanding of the range of “internal” trade remedies and enforcement mechanisms 
used within the European internal market. This may also raise issues of capacity building 
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depending on the regional context, as well as of domestic structural adjustments necessary in 
promoting cross-regional regulatory cooperation. Yet even as this comparison continues to hold, 
there are indications that the historical development of market integration in other contexts, 
notably ASEAN and NAFTA, is in fact, evolving in different ways, and that some of the 
governance issues in the European context have yet to be addressed (Pastor, 2011). In this regard, 
we need to focus on the dynamic institutional effects created by the deepening of market 
integration, as institutions are simultaneously constraining, in that they set the rules of the game, 
creating path dependent effects and constructive, in that they may generate institutional change 
elsewhere through their spillover effects, as evidenced by the shift from goods to services, and 
from product to process standards, for example. What Europe has learned over the past six decades 
can be of value to other regional trade blocs as they seek to tackle a variety of trade barriers, 
different regulatory practices, and different models of economic organization, governance and 
state-market relations. The question is not whether the European Union should be emulated, but 
how we can profit from understanding the tensions, contradictions, and differentiated integration 
that characterizes Europe, by giving a more accurate picture of its market integration experience 
and governance dilemmas. 
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